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Professor Finkelman and Professor Carrington were wrong in
suggesting that "evil" figures like Thomas Cobb and Lucius Lamar
are no longer present in the legal community.' Thomas Cobb, a
leading slavery proponent after the Civil War, and Lucius Lamar,
a proponent of slavery and southern secession, who after the Civil
War became an advocate of voting rights for African-Americans,
are not gone today. These men are alive and working for the to-
bacco industry. The tobacco companies read Thomas Cobb's works.
They realized that if he could explain that African-Americans
needed to be slaves, deserved to be slaves and that it was all bio-
logical, he could also explain why tobacco smoke does not cause
disease. In addition, he could explain how reports that demon-
strate how tobacco smoke causes cancer are faulty and in need of
much more scientific confirmation.
Lucius Lamar has found an even better position in the tobacco
industry. He is an executive of sorts and doing public relations.
He is explaining how the industry has turned over a new leaf since
they have lost major lawsuits. He is explaining how the industry
has been thoroughly punished by having to pay money and raising
prices, even if only a little bit. Tobacco companies have taken it to
heart and are no longer going after children. As long as there is a
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. Lecture Deliv-
ered April 16, 1999 at Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. See Paul Finkelman, Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery, 5
Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 75 (1999); Paul D. Carrington, Lawyers Amid the Re-
demption of the South, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 41 (1999).
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tobacco industry, the Cobbs and Lamars of this world will be hap-
pily employed.
II. THE "NoRMAL" ROLEs OF TOBACCO INDUsTRY LAWYERS
Before discussing the peculiar role that some tobacco industry
lawyers have played in managing the industry's deadly conspira-
cies, I would like to discuss the "normal" roles of tobacco industry
lawyers. There is often an acute and perhaps unresolveable ten-
sion between a lawyer's roles as a decent human being, a good citi-
zen and a counselor to and an advocate for a truly evil person or
entity. In carrying out one's professional role, it is easy to find one-
self skillfully promoting an unjust cause, often enough with the re-
sult that the world is a worse place for one's efforts.
Most lawyers for the tobacco industry are in just this situa-
tion. The cigarette companies' products and behavior each year
cause about a million young Americans to become addicted to nico-
tine, as well as more than 400,000 deaths among older American
smokers.2 But, for example, my former Civil Procedure professor,
the late Paul Bator, whom I had greatly admired, brilliantly repre-
sented the tobacco industry in the 1980s on the issue of preemp-
tion.3 The result was that a succession of United States courts of
appeals ruled that plaintiffs could not introduce evidence of the in-
dustry's continued lying about the dangers of cigarettes after the
passage of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in
1965.4 By the time the United States Supreme Court corrected
this nonsense in 1992,5 Professor Bator was dead, but so was the
2. See Stanton A. Glantz et al., The Cigarette Papers at xvii (1996) (stating
that "tobacco products kill 420,000 American smokers and 53,000 non-smokers
every year"); Michael Eriksen, Scientific Facts Support CDC Tobacco Death Esti-
mate, Greensboro News & Rec., July 11, 1999, at Hi, available in 1999 WL
6953049 (stating that "more than 400,000 deaths in this country are prematurely
caused by smoking-related diseases"); Patricia Guthrie, Deadly American Export:
Tobacco, Atlanta J. & Const., May 22, 1999, at A6, available in 1999 WL 3772785
(stating that "[ci urrently, 400,000 American deaths-one in five-are attributed to
tobacco use").
3. For an example of Paul Bator's scholarship, see Paul M. Bator et al., Hart
and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (3d ed. 1988).
4. See Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir.
1988); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625-26 (1st Cir. 1987); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 1986).
5. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1992):
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"second wave" of tobacco litigation, which had offered great prom-
ise of holding the tobacco companies accountable and forcing them
to change their behavior with consequent reductions in tobacco
consumption, disease and death.6
Less illustrious lawyers than Professor Bator have labored
quietly, but effectively, to keep plaintiffs suing tobacco companies
from getting their day in court. As one attorney for R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company put it in a memorandum to the company's files,
[Tihe aggressive posture we have taken regarding depositions
and discovery in general continues to make these cases ex-
tremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers,
particularly sole practitioners. To paraphrase General Pat-
ton, the way we won these cases was not by spending all of
[RJR]'s money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend
all of his. 7
While this behavior may (or may not) be sanctionable under profes-
sional rules,8 and may indeed reflect the state of the art in much
Wnsofar as claims under either failure-to-warn theory require a showing
that [Liggett Group's] post-1969 advertising or promotions should have
included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those claims are
pre-empted. The [Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969] does not,
however, pre-empt [Cipolone's] claims that rely soley on [Liggett Group's]
testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or
promotion.
6. See Richard A. Daynard, Tobacco Liability Litigation as a Cancer Control
Strategy, 80 J. Natl Cancer Inst. 9 (1988) (noting that '[a]s of the end of 1987 there
were about 125 cases against the tobacco industry pending in 17 states").
7. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414,421 (D.N.J. 1993) (citation
omitted).
8. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4 (1998). Rule 3.4
states:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlaw-
fully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having poten-
tial evidentary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person
to do any such act;
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or
offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal ex-
cept for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists;
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to
make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery
request by an opposing party;
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence,
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litigation practice today, it clearly violated the spirit of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 9 and predictably contributed to the same
dire social consequences as Professor Bator's professionally spot-
less advocacy.
Even tobacco industry lawyers who are not on the front lines of
the battle with public health forces, the ones who work, for exam-
ple, on commercial, employment and real estate matters, are still
helping a killer industry do its lethal work. Facilitation of evil can
never entirely escape the taint of evil, despite the bureaucratic and
professional rules that define one's job, such as, "just making the
trains run on time." After all, one could have worked for a differ-
ent industry or for a law firm with different clients. 10
III. THE "GOOD" Guys
Before discussing the lawyers who have behaved even worse
than the "normal" tobacco industry lawyers, I should say some-
thing about the industry lawyers who have behaved better. This is
a very short list! Marc Kasowitz, a lawyer for Brooke Group (for-
merly Liggett Tobacco Company), successfully counseled its CEO,
Bennett LeBow, to abandon the industry's conspiracy of silence-
indeed, active misrepresentation-about the dangers of its prod-
ucts. Brooke Group, Kasowitz and LeBow have all done very well,
as well as very good, by telling the truth about what Liggett and
the industry have known for decades. In addition to Kasowitz and
LeBow, there are doubtless anonymous tobacco industry lawyers
who have counseled their clients to behave decently, or who have
assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a
witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credi-
bility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or inno-
cence of an accused; or
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily
giving relevant information to another party unless:
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a cli-
ent; and
(2) the lawyer reasonbly believes that the person's interests will
not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
Id.
9. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 11, 37.
10. Indeed, a colleague of Professor Bator's, Laurence Tribe, reportedly re-
ceived the first offer (for "seven figures") from the tobacco industry to argue the
preemption issue for it. Professor Tribe turned it down. See National Public Ra-
dio (Morning Edition, Jan. 13, 1992).
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violated their professional (though perhaps not moral) obligations
by quietly sabotaging some particularly destructive industry
ploy.11
IV. THE "BAD" Guys
The tobacco industry has devised a role for lawyers that is un-
professional, as well as immoral, tortious and criminal. Tobacco
industry lawyers do much more than advising their clients of the
legal consequences of their actions and defending them in court.
They actually direct and manage all aspects of the industry's dis-
information campaign on smoking and health, and have been do-
ing so for the past forty years. 12
This situation arose because, in the words of two British to-
bacco executives who visited their United States counterparts in
1964:
In the U.S., by far the most important factor conditioning
action by the manufacturers is the law suit situation and the
danger of costly damages being awarded against the manu-
facturers in a flood of cases ....
In consequence of the importance of the lawsuits, the
main power on the smoking and health situation undoubtedly
rest with the lawyers .... 13
They added that the lawyers' control extends to "all smoking
and health matters-research and public relations matters, for ex-
ample, as well as legal matters." 14 The demonstrated reach of the
tobacco industry lawyers is, indeed, extraordinarily broad. They
closely monitor all in-house research, closing down projects that
threaten to demonstrate adverse health effects. 15 In at least two
incidents, 16 tobacco industry lawyers have shut down in-house lab-
11. Perhaps the person who leaked the "General Patton" memorandum, see
supra text accompanying note 7, to my office and elsewhere, was just such a
lawyer.
12. See Glantz et aL, supra note 2, at 339-90.
13. Reports on Policy Aspects of the Smoking and Health Situations in U.S.A.
(visited July 28, 1999) <http:/www.tobacco.neu.edu/Extra/1964memo.htm>.
14. Id.
15. See Glantz et al., supra note 2, at 265-67 (discussing the complete immer-
sion of attorneys in the research process to prevent harmful information from com-
ing to light).
16. See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 2): Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Corn-
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oratories, seizing the laboratory notebooks, killing the laboratory
animals, and pensioning off the investigators. The lawyers organ-
ized outside, "independent" researchers, hiring and coaching these
undercover scientific "consultants" on the industry's official line,
dispatching them to conferences, and suggesting, editing and even
ghost-writing articles and letters for them to publish in scientific
journals. 17 They oversaw the Counsel for Tobacco Research, the
industry-funded but supposedly independent scientific funding or-
ganization that the industry claimed was devoted to determining
whether smoking causes disease.' 8 Their job was to make sure
that truly independent scientists were not funded for projects
which might reveal such connections, while keeping an eye out for
weak-willed scientists who might be recruited as "consultants."19
A recently uncovered report from the London office of Coving-
ton & Burling, the prestigious Washington D.C. law firm, illus-
trates many of the non-legal, and highly unethical tasks
undertaken by tobacco industry lawyers on behalf of their clients.
The Report on the European Consultancy Programme,20 written in
March 1990, was one of approximately 39,000 documents in the
Minnesota Attorney General's case against the tobacco industry
that the defendants claimed were privileged, but that the trial
court deprivileged on the basis that they came within the "crime-
fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege. 21 The "crime-
fraud" exception applies where the attorneys participated in the
commission of the crime or fraud.22 The defendants appealed this
merce, 103rd Cong. 55-56 (1995) (testimony of Dr. Victor DeNoble); Justin
Catanoso, Research Project in the Spotlight at Smoking Trial, Greensboro News &
Rec., Apr. 22, 1997, at B4, available in 1997 WL 4581061.
17. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1488-92 (1999).
18. See id. at 1489-90.
19. See id. at 1489.
20. Report on the European Consultancy Programme (visited Aug. 30, 1999)
<http://www.tobacco.org/Documents/900301covington.html>.
21. See generally United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) ("It is the
purpose of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege to assure that
the 'seal of secrecy,'... between lawyer and client does not extend to communica-
tions 'made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud' or
crime.") (citations omitted).
22. See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoenas v. United States, 144 F.3d 653,
660 (10th Cir. 1998) ("To invoke the crime-fraud exception, the party opposing the
privilege must present prima facie evidence that the allegation of attorney partici-
pation in the crime or fraud has some foundation in fact.") (citations omitted).
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ruling all the way up to the United States Supreme Court; when
their final appeals were exhausted, they handed the documents
over to the House Commerce Committee, which put them on its
website.23
Much of Covington & Burling's European Consultancy Pro-
gramme, also known as The Whitecoat Project, involved secretly re-
taining (i.e., bribing) scientists who held or obtained positions
advising public health authorities on issues involving the health
effects of environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS"). Thus,
[o]ne consultant is, for example, the advisor to a particularly
relevant committee of the House of Commons. One is the ex-
ecutive director of a leading scientific society that considers
workplace and related issues. Several are advisors to the Eu-
ropean Community on scientific matters. Several have been
members of the working groups of the International Agency
for Research in Cancer.... One consultant is a medical advi-
sor to several Middle Eastern governments. 24
And one is an editor of The Lancet, a "very influential British medi-
cal journal, and is continuing to publish numerous reviews, editori-
als and comments on ETS and other issues."25
Covington & Burling's "consultants . . . created the world's
only learned scientific society addressing questions of indoor air
quality."2 6 According to the report, the society "will . . . have its
own scientific journal, . . . will sponsor meetings and conferences,
. . . and thus can serve as an independent and accepted source of
ideas and research regarding IAQ [indoor air quality] to the public
and the scientific community"2 7-while, of course, concealing the
tobacco industry sponsorship. Similarly, they created a for-profit
consulting group to offer "consulting services to companies and
governments on IAQ issues"2 8-presumably for the purpose of de-
frauding the group's customers by denying or downplaying the ef-
fects of ETS on the "sick buildings" they were hired to study.29
23. See Chairman Tom Bliley Releases Subpoenaed Tobacco Documents to the
American People (visited Sept. 1, 1999) <http:/www.house.gov/commnerce /Tobacco
Docs/documents.html>.
24. Report on the European Consultancy Programme, supra note 20, at 8.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Similar allegations were made about Healthy Buildings International, a
United States IAQ consultant. See Staff of Subcomm. on Health and the Environ-
1999]
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Much of Covington & Burling's efforts were directed to casting
doubt on the causal relationship between ETS and lung cancer, in-
cluding developing competing hypotheses about lung cancer causa-
tion. These were the themes of major scientific conferences,
sessions and presentations which they organized in Montreal, Lis-
bon, Hanover, Germany, Budapest, Visby, Sweden, Oslo, Milan
and Switzerland. They arranged for their consultants to publish
books on ETS and health, on IAQ and on Toxicology, as well as a
variety of scientific articles, all stressing the same themes.30 Im-
plicit in this report, which never names any of these consultants, is
that even though these consultants were working for the tobacco
industry, their true employer was to be concealed from their listen-
ers and readers. This would encourage listeners and readers to
mistake these consultants' paid opinions for disinterested science.
V. THE TOBACCO INDusTRY's DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN
Why did the tobacco companies assign primary responsibility
for their disinformation campaign to their lawyers? Is it that to-
bacco executives shared the public's contempt for lawyers-the be-
lief that lawyers would do whatever it takes to "win?" Perhaps,...
but more likely it was an accident of history. When the first wave
of tobacco liability suits began in 1954, the industry's lawyers were
necessarily involved. While they could have confined themselves
to defending the cases one by one, they would naturally have been
asked for, or volunteered, their opinions as to how the industry
could minimize its exposure to such suits in the future. It was a
small step from devising a plan of action, to being asked to imple-
ment it.
In any event, the lawyers had some unique assets to bring to
the table. In addition to hiding or destroying documents, 31 which
anyone could do, the lawyers could cloak them in one of two legal
"privileges:" the work product rule or the attorney-client privilege.
The work product rule protects materials developed by attorneys
ment, United States House Energy and Conmerce Comm., Environmental To-
bacco Smoke: Investigation, 9.6 Tobacco Prods. Litig. Rep. 7.249 (1994). Healthy
Buildings International's tobacco-related activities were also allegedly sponsored
by the tobacco industry and controlled by Covington & Burling. See United States
ex rel. Seckler v. Healthy Bldgs Intl, Inc., 9.5 Tobacco Prods. Litig. Rep. 3.695
(D.D.C. Nov. 7, 1994).
30. See Report on the European Consultancy Programme, supra note 20, at 6.
31. See Glantz et al., supra note 2, at 246-47.
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in the course of preparing to bring or defend litigation from discov-
ery.3 2 The attorney-client privilege protects from discovery com-
munications between attorneys and clients regarding legal
advice. 33
In theory, these two privileges are not supposed to be useful
for running a disinformation campaign. After all, "the attorney-cli-
ent privilege does not protect non-legal business advice given by a
lawyer."34 Nor does the work product rule cover such activities as
promulgating document destruction policies, to say nothing of cre-
ating false science and sabotaging true science, even though all of
these activities might strengthen a company's position in future
litigation.35 And, as mentioned earlier, the crime-fraud exception
vitiates an otherwise valid assertion of privilege if the advice was
given or the materials were created, in furtherance of an ongoing
crime or fraud.36
But once an attorney asserts any of these privileges, it is very
difficult for the opposing party to gain access to the documents in
question, even if the assertions were legally baseless and made in
total bad faith.37 Assertedly privileged documents do not have to
be handed over in discovery, even if they are otherwise responsive
to the request.38 While the party asserting the privilege is nor-
32. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) ("Not even the most lib-
eral of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the
mental impressions of an attorney.").
33. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888):
The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications be-
tween client and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest
and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of
the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and
readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of
disclosure.
34. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611,618 (E.D.N.C.
1992) (citation omitted).
35. See In re John Doe v. United States, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981)
("The work product rule recognizes the lawyer's services as an indispensable part
of the judicial scheme, but it was not designed as a fringe benefit for protecting
lawyers who would, for their personal advantage, abuse it.").
36. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Dixie Mill Supply Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 168 F.R.D. 554,
558 (E.D.La. 1996) ("The mere fact that a claim of bad faith ... or other claim or
defense based on a party's state of mind is involved does not waive the attorney-
client privilege.") (citation omitted).
38. See, e.g., Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141 F.R.D. 408, 416-17
(M.D.N.C. 1992) (describing how almost 350 documents were withheld from dis-
covery under attorney-client privilege, work product, or another claim).
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mally required to submit a privilege log to facilitate the other
party's challenge of assertion, in fact, the process is quite cumber-
some and inexact; judges are not eager to go through the docu-
ments "in camera" to determine the validity of the privilege, and
most lawyers will not bother to press the issue. Furthermore, it is
rare for judges to make a finding that the crime-fraud exception
applies. Thus, as a practical matter, thousands of highly incrimi-
nating tobacco industry documents have been protected from dis-
covery through improper assertions of the attorney-client privilege
and the work product rule.
It is, of course, criminal, tortious and unprofessional to direct,
manage, or even simply participate in a scheme to extract money
from consumers through deception or trickery. The fact that the
consumers might get sick or die as a result of the fraud only makes
it worse. Being a lawyer is not supposed to provide any protection
from the general commands of the law. But, although law firms
were named as defendants and co-conspirators in several of the
state attorney general actions that were settled last year, the law
firms were not required to pay into the settlement. Nor, to my
knowledge, has any professional discipline been imposed. And, of
course, no criminal cases have yet been brought against them
either.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question remains whether lawyer management of systems
of evil makes things worse. To the extent that lawyers bring spe-
cial tools to the job, for example, the ability to invoke special privi-
leges or simply experience in successfully evading justice, this
makes things worse. To the extent that law firms develop exper-
tise at managing specific systems of evil, and over several decades
pass this expertise from one generation of lawyers to the next, all
bound by professional vows of public silence, this makes things
worse. The ultimate ethical rationalization of lawyers (i.e., that all
they are doing is zealously representing their clients), desensitizes
some of the "best and the brightest" to the true horror of what they
are doing. Thus, they are enabled to do it. This too makes things
worse.
